The Concentration and Distribution of Votes by Borooah, Vani
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Concentration and Distribution of
Votes
Vani Borooah
University of Ulster
December 2014
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/76621/
MPRA Paper No. 76621, posted 7 February 2017 13:51 UTC
1 
 
Chapter 7 
The Concentration and Distribution of Votes 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 The previous chapter analysed the electoral efficiency of the INC and BJP in terms of their 
ability to convert votes into seats.  A large part of this ability depends upon the geographical 
distribution of their vote. An excessive concentration of thee part’s vote in a small area leads to a 
small of seats with large majorities. On the other hand, if spread too thinly, electoral support 
dissipates resulting in many ‘near misses’ but few electoral successes. This observation leads, in this 
chapter to an analysis of the distribution of the party vote between constituencies and between states..  
Within this broad theme, we pursue two topics. Firstly, there is the question of concentration. 
Borrowing an analogy from industrial economics, are there differences between in the INC and the 
BJP in the degree to which their votes and seats are concentrated in the various states and union 
territories which produce their votes and seats?  The second question relates to the unevenness in the 
distribution of the INC and BJP vote across the constituencies. In terms of their seat tally, to what 
extent would the two parties benefit, or suffer, from a more equal distribution of their vote? To put 
matters differently, what proportion of the seats won by the INC and the BJP was due to a high 
average vote and what proportion was the result of a favourable distribution of votes? 
The first question is answered in terms of measures of concentration popular in the industrial 
economics literature, in particular, the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of concentration. The issue that is 
addressed here is vote supply: how much of a party’s total vote is sourced from different 
states/constituencies? Then, there is the different, and conceptually separate, issue of vote shares: 
what proportion of the total vote in a state/constituency does a party obtain? We show how the two 
issues of vote supply and vote shares are related and arrive at measures of vote concentration (issue 1) 
and vote distribution (issue 2).  Lastly, the chapter, using electoral simulations, shows how differences 
in their respective vote distributions affect the electoral fortunes of the INC and the BJP very 
differently.  
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7.2 Where the Votes Come From: The Concentration of Votes by State 
 One can think of the total number of votes obtained by a party (V) as being produced by K 
(k=1…K) states, with each state producing Vk votes for the party.  If V is excessively concentrated in a 
few states – that is, is the production of votes for the party is characterised by oligopolistic tendencies 
– then it will win few seats but with large majorities. On the other hand, if V is fairly evenly spread 
over the states – that is, is the production of votes for the party is characterised by competitive 
tendencies – then it may again win few seats, this time with small majorities.  The optimal 
geographical distribution of the total national vote of a party must, therefore, take regard of both 
having enough supporters in a state’s constituencies to comprise a plurality of voters while, at the 
same time, avoiding concentration of its total support in just a few states. 
 These considerations raise the question of the degree to which the votes of the INC and BJP 
are concentrated in the states.  A popular measure of concentration, used in the industrial economics 
literature, to measure the degree of competition in a market, is the Hirschman-Herfindahl index 
(HHI).1  Applied to the concentration of a party’s votes across the Indian states, the HHI for party j is 
represented by jHHI and defined as: 
 ( )2
1
 
K
j j
k
k
HHI v
=
=∑  (7.1)  
 where: jV  is total number of votes obtained by party j; jkV  is total number of votes obtained by party 
j in state k; and  j j jk kv V V= is state k’s share in party j’s total vote (k=1…K).  At one extreme, if state 
k produces all the votes for party j, then 1 jkv = and 1
jHHI = , which is the maximum value of the 
index. At the other extreme, if all the states have an equal share in the total vote for party j, 
1 /jHHI K= which is the minimum value of the index.  Consequently, 1 / 1jK HHI≤ ≤ . 
<Table 7.1> 
   
                                                     
1 See Hirschman (1964). 
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Table 7.1 shows: (i) the shares of India’s major states in the total vote produced by these 
states; (ii) the shares of India’s major states in the total INC vote produced by these states; (iii) the 
shares of India’s major states in the total BJP vote produced by these states. The last lines of Table 7.1 
compare the total Lok Sabha vote in the major states with the total all-India Lok Sabha vote: this 
shows, for example, that in 2014, the former was nearly 97 percent of the latter; similarly, the total 
INC and BJP vote in the major states were, respectively, 96 and 97 percent of the corresponding all-
India vote.  
Of the total vote emanating from the major states in the Lok Sabha election of 2014, Uttar 
Pradesh produced 15.1 percent, followed by West Bengal with 9.6 percent, Maharashtra with 9.1 
percent, and Andhra Pradesh with 9 percent.  Table 7.1 also shows that, in the 2014 Lok Sabha 
election, the BJP did particularly well, and the INC did particularly badly, in Uttar Pradesh: 20.6 
percent of the BJP vote, but only 5.9 percent of the INC vote, came from this state which produced 
over 15 percent of the total (major states) vote. By contrast, in the same election, the INC did 
particularly well, and the BJP did particularly badly, in Orissa: 5.4 percent of the INC vote, but only 
2.8 percent of the BJP vote, came from this state which produced 4 percent of the total (major states) 
vote. 
<Table 7.2> 
Table 7.2 shows values of the HHI (defined by equation (7.1)), for each Lok Sabha election 
since 1989, with the major states as the vote-generating units.  The values are shown with respect to: 
(i) the total vote emanating from the major states; (ii) the total INC vote emanating from the major 
states; and (iii) the total BJP vote emanating from the major states.  This table shows that for every 
election between 1989 and 2014, the BJP had associated HHI values which were greater than the 
corresponding HHI values for the INC: this implied that, in the context of the major states, the BJP’s 
votes were more concentrated than those of the INC.  This is a reflection of the fact that the INC, as 
the older party, has significant presence in parts of India – like Assam, Kerala, and Jammu and 
Kashmir – where the BJP, until recently, has been all but invisible. 
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Also shown are the values with respect to two other indices.  The first of these is Shannon’s 
entropy index defined as: 
 ( )
1
log
K
j j
k k
k
E v v
=
= −∑   (7.2) 
And the second of these is the dissimilarity index defined as: 
 
1
1 1
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k
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∑   (7.3) 
  If a state’s vote share, with respect to party j is equal to 1 (meaning that party j gets all its 
votes from that state) so that, say, 1 21,  ... 0
j j j
Kv v v= = = , then E=0, which is its minimum value, and 
D=K-1 which is its maximum value; on the other hand, if all the states have equal shares in party j’s 
total vote so that, 1 2 .... 1 /
j j j
Kv v v K= = = = , then log(1 / )E K=  and which is its maximum value and 
D=0, which is its minimum value.  The values of these indices confirm the fact that, in the context of 
the major Indian states, the BJP vote is more concentrated than that of the INC: for every election 
between 1989 and 2014, the value of the entropy index (E in equation (7.2)) is higher – and the value 
of the dissimilarity index (D in equation (7.3)) is lower - for the INC compared to its value for the 
BJP. 
The Effective Number of States 
 As Table 7.1 shows, over 536 million votes cast in the 2014 Lok Sabha election emanated 
from the 20 major Indian states. The contributions from the different states, however, varied 
considerably, from Uttar Pradesh’s 15.1 percent of the total vote to Himachal Pradesh’s 0.6 percent. 
This makes the obvious point that, in terms of ‘producing’ votes, not all states are equal; it also raises, 
by way of corollary, a query about the effective number of states in the political system when the 20 
major states were adjusted by their vote shares. 
 This concept of an ‘effective number’ was first applied to political parties (see Dunleavy and 
Boucek, 2003). Suppose there are N political parties in the system with each party receiving different 
vote shares. Some of these vote shares might be so small, and others so large, that, effectively, there 
are fewer than N political parties in the electoral system. Laakso and Taggepera (1979) suggested that 
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the effective number of parties, N*, could be computed as the inverse of the Hirschman-Herfindahl 
index as: 
 * 1 /N HHI=   (7.4) 
where: HHI is the Hirschman-Herfindahl index computed from the vote shares of the N parties. If all 
the N parties received the same share of the total vote, 1/N, HHI=1/N, and N*=N : the effective 
number of parties is same as the total number of parties.  If one party obtained the entire vote, HHI=1 
and N*=1: effectively, the electoral system consists of a single party.  In general, the greater the 
concentration of votes (larger the HHI value), the smaller will be the number of effective parties. 
 These ideas can equally be applied to the Indian states which contribute unequally to the total 
amount of votes they generate. Consequently, the effective number of (major) states is smaller than the 
actual number, 20, of states. How much smaller, can be determined by applying the Laakso and 
Taggepera (1979) formula of equation (7.4).  So, in the 2014 election, the HHI values for the INC and 
the BJP were, respectively, 0.069 and 0.094: consequently, the effective number of states for the INC 
and the BJP were, respectively, 14.5 (=1/0.069) and 10.6 (=1/0.094).  The effective number of states 
differs between the two parties because the concentration of their votes, within the major states, is 
different: the number of effective states was larger for the INC - with a smaller concentration of its 
vote – than for the BJP with a greater vote concentration. 
7.3. Inequality in the Inter-Constituency Distribution of Party Vote Shares 
  The previous section addressed the question of vote supply in the context of the major Indian 
states with particular reference to the concentration of the national vote.  In that section the key 
variables were the proportions of the total vote, the total INC vote, and the total BJP vote that were 
sourced from the different states: for example, in the 2014 Lok Sabha election, 20.6 percent of the 
BJP vote was sourced from Uttar Pradesh while Madhya Pradesh supplied 10 percent of the INC vote.  
This section turns to the separate, but related, question of party vote shares, namely, the proportion of 
the total vote in a particular geographical area (state or constituency) that accrued to a particular 
political party. It is relatively straightforward to show that vote supply (previous section) and vote 
shares (this section), though conceptually different, are, in fact, empirically related. 
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 Suppose that, of the total of kV votes in an area k (for example, state or constituency), 
j
kV  are 
in favour of party j.  Then the vote share of party j in area k (k=1…K) is represented by j jk k kv V V= .  
Let 
1 1
 and 
K K
j j
k k
k k
V V V V
= =
= =∑ ∑  represent, respectively, the total (national) vote (over all parties) and 
party j’s total (national) vote. Then the vote share can be decomposed in the terms of vote supply as 
follows: 
 ( )( )( ) ( )/ / / /  ( / )( / )( / ) /j j j j j j j j jk k k k k k k k kv V V V V V V V V V V V V V V g n v= = = =   (7.5) 
 where: j j jk kg V V=  is the proportionate contribution that area k makes to the party j’s national vote; 
k kn V V=  is the proportionate contribution that area k makes to the total (national) vote; and 
j
jv V V=  is party j’s share of the national vote. 
 By way of a numerical example, suppose that k represents Uttar Pradesh and that j represents 
the BJP.  Now, from Table 7.1, for the Lok Sabha election of 2014, 20.6,  15.1,  and 31j jk k kg n v= = = , 
implying, from equation (7.5) that the BJP obtained 42.3 percent of the total vote in Uttar Pradesh. 
 In this section, we measure inequality in the distribution of inter-constituency vote shares of 
the INC and the BJP in the major states and, having done that, in the section following we decompose 
inter-constituency inequality by the states to which the constituencies belong. The first exercise, of 
inequality measurement, will suggest a relationship between electoral popularity and electoral 
inequality while the second exercise, of inequality decomposition, will evaluate how much of overall 
inter-constituency inequality in vote shares can be explained by the aggregation of constituencies by 
state.  
 The inequality measure used, both for measurement and for decomposition, belongs to the 
family of entropy measures. The logic of the entropy measure is taken from information theory. 
Suppose that a party’s vote share, v, is a random variable which takes values, 1 2, ,..., Nv v v , over N 
constituencies, with probabilities, 1 2
1
, ,..., ,  0 1,  1
N
N i i
i
p p p p p
=
≤ ≤ =∑ .  Now the information content of 
a message that the random variable v has taken an unusual value is greater than that of a message that 
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is has taken a more commonly observed value.  Hence the information content, ih   of v taking a 
specific value iv  is a decreasing function of pi, the probability of observing that value, so that 
( )i ih h p=  is a decreasing function of the pi.  Also, since the values assumed by v are assumed 
independent of each other, the information content of the joint occurrence of two values, say, rv v=  
and sv v=  is the sum of the individual information contents: ( , ) ( ) ( )r s r sh v v h v h v= + .  A decreasing 
function that satisfies this property is ( ) log(1 / ) log( )i i ih p p p= = − . 
 A measure of the expected amount of information or entropy in a system, defined by the 
values of a random variable v and the associated probabilities, is given by (Renyi, 1965): 
 
1 1
( ) log( )
N N
i i i i
i i
E p h p p p
= =
= = −∑ ∑   (7.6) 
 The maximum value of E in equation (7.6) – and also in equation (7.2) - occurs when the 
values are equally likely so that 1 2 ... 1 /Np p p N= = = =  and a measure of the disorder of the system 
is the extent to which the expected value falls below this maximum: 
 ( ) [ ]
1 1 1
maximum value observed value
1 (1 ) ( ) log( ) log(1 / )
N N N
i i i
i i i
I N h N p h p p N
= = =
= × − × = −∑ ∑ ∑
(((((( (((
  (7.7) 
The larger the value of I in equation (7.7), the greater will be the disorder or inequality in the system. 
If we set the probabilities to the observed vote shares, so that i ip v= , i=1…N, and let v  represent the 
mean vote share, we can obtain Theil’s (1967) Mean Logarithmic Deviation (MLD) index as: 
 
1
log( /
N
i
i
MLD v v N
=
 
=  
 
∑   (7.8) 
Table 7.3 shows the MLD and Gini values for the INC and the BJP in respect of the inter-
constituency distribution of their vote shares for every Lok Sabha election between 1989 and 2014 
with higher values of both indices representing higher inequality levels.2 These values show that 
inequality in the distribution of INC vote shares was at a low in 1989; thereafter it rose steadily, 
reaching a peak in 1998; it fell in 1999, remained fairly steady till 2009 but then rose sharply in 2014.  
                                                     
2 The Gini coefficient is defined in chapter 2. 
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By contrast the inter-constituency distribution of the BJP vote was highly unequal in 1989 after which 
it fell reaching a low in 1999; then it peaked in 2009 before falling back in 2014.  
<Table 7.3> 
Set alongside the values of the MLD and Gini indices are the party vote shares. These make 
clear (see Figures 7.1 and 7.2) that, in general, whenever overall support for a party was high, 
inequality in the distribution of the party’s vote share, between the constituencies, was low: the INC 
in 1989, 1991, and 2009 and the BJP in 1998, 1999, and 2014.  Conversely, whenever overall support 
for a party was low, inequality in the distribution of the party’s vote share, between the constituencies, 
was high: the INC in 1998 and 2014 and the BJP in 1989, 1991, 1996, and 2009. 
<Figures 7.1 and 7.2> 
7.4 The Decomposition of Inequality in Vote Shares 
Inequality in a party’s vote share across the dfferent constituencies leads one to ask: what 
‘explains’ such inequality?  Is it due to the fact that constituencies are segmented into states, with 
different states embodying different ‘political’ cultures’?  In that case we would expect that some of 
the observed inequality can be explained by differences between states because constituencies in some 
states offer, on average, a lower vote share to that party compared to constituencies in other states. 
But not all of inequality in vote shares can be explained by differences between states  – some of the 
observed (overall) inequality will be due to to the fact that there is inequality in constituencies within 
the same state because the party does not receive the same vote share from all constituencies within a 
particular state.   
Of course, one need not subdivide constituencies by state – one could, equally well, have 
subdivided them by region (for example: North, South, East, West, and Central) or by their level of 
income (for example: low-income, medium-income, and high-income states). Whenever, and 
however, one subdivides households there are always two sources of inequality: between-group and 
within-group.  The method of inequality decomposition attempts to separate (or decompose) overall 
inequality into these two constituent parts: between-group inequality and within-group inequality.  
9 
 
When the decomposition is additive, overall inequality can be written as the sum of within group and 
between group inequality: 
 
  
overall ineqality within group inequality between group inequality
I A B= +   
 When inequality is additively decomposed then one can say that the basis on which the 
constituencies were subdivided (say, by state) contributed [(B/I)×100]% to overall inequality in a 
party’s vote shares, the remaining inequality, [(A/I)×100]%, being due to inequality within the states.  
If one subdivided the constituencies by income (say, three groups) and by state (20 major states), so 
that one had 60 categories, then by additively decomposing inequality, as above, one could say that 
income and state collectively accounted for [(B/I)×100]% of overall inequality in the vote shares of a 
party, the remaining inequality being due to inequality within the 60 categories. So, inequality 
decomposition provides a way of analysing the extent to which inter-constituency inequality in a 
party’s vote share can be ‘explained’ by a constellation of factors. 
More formally, suppose that the total of N constituencies is divided into M mutually exclusive 
states groups with Nm (m=1…M) constituencies in each state.  Let { }iv=v  and { }iv=mv  represent 
the vector of vote shares for a party in, respectively, all the constituencies (i=1…N) and in the 
constituencies in state m.  Then an inequality index ( ; )I Nv  defined over this vector is said to be 
additively decomposable if: 
 
1
( ; ) ( ; )
M
m m
m
I N I N w
=
= + = +∑ mv v B A B                            (7.9) 
where: ( ; )I Nv  represents the overall level of inequality; ( ; )mI Nmv  represents the level of inequality 
within state m;  A – expressed as the weighted sum of the inequality in each state, wm being the 
weights – and B represent, respectively, the within-group and the between-group contribution to 
overall inequality.  
 If, indeed, inequality can be ‘additively decomposed’ along the lines of equation (7.9) above, 
then, as Cowell and Jenkins (1995) have argued, the proportionate contribution of the between-group 
component (B) to overall inequality is the income inequality literature’s analogue of the R2 statistic 
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used in regression analysis: the size of this contribution is a measure of the amount of inequality that 
can be ‘explained’ by the factor (or factors) used to subdivide the sample.     
 Only inequality indices which belong to the family of Generalised Entropy Indices are 
additively decomposable (Shorrocks, 1980).  These indices are defined by a parameter θ and, when 
θ=0, the weights are the constituency shares of the different states (that is, /m mw N N= ); since the 
weights sum to unity, the within-group contribution A of equation (7.9) is a weighted average of the 
inequality levels within the groups.  When θ=0, the inequality index is Theil’s Mean Logarithmic 
Deviation (MLD), defined in equation (7.8) of the previous section, which, because of its attractive 
features in terms of the interpretation of the weights, is used in this chapter to decompose inequality in 
a party’s vote shares. 
<Figure 7.3> 
 Figure 7.3 shows the within-state and between-state contributions to inter-constituency 
inequality in INC and BJP vote shares.  This shows that for several elections – 1989, 1996, 1999, 
2009, and 2014 – the between state contribution to inequality in the distribution of BJP vote shares 
exceeded 60 percent and this contribution was not less than 50 percent for any election. Except for the  
Lok Sabha election of 1998, the between state contribution to inequality in the INC vote share was 
always lower than the corresponding contribution for the BJP.  The overall consensus from this 
decomposition is that, for both parties, over half of inequality in the distribution of inter-constituency 
vote shares could be explained by the location of the constituencies in different states.   
7.5 The Effect of the Distribution of Votes on the Number of Seats Won 
We hypothesise that the number of seats won (S) by a party at a Lok Sabha election, given  
the number of seats contested, depends upon its mean vote (µ) and the degree of inequality (I) in the 
distribution of its vote both computed over the constituencies in which it fielded candidates.3  More 
formally: 
                                                     
3 While the number of consistencies a party contests sets an upper limit to the number of seats it can win, it does 
not follow that that the more seats its contests, the larger will be the number of seats it wins: in the Lok Sabha 
election of 1999, the INC contested 453 constituencies but won only 114 seats while the BJP contested 339 
constituencies and won 182 seats.   
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Simulation A: The Equal Distribution of Votes   
It is impossible to specify a priori the distribution of votes (as encapsulated in the value of I 
in equation (7.10)) which, in the face of a given total of votes, will maximise the number of seats 
won. So, in order to investigate the separate contributions of µ and I to the number of seats won by the 
BJP and INC, we ran a simulation in which, with the mean vote of each party unchanged, the inter-
constituency vote distribution of the two parties was rendered the same; we then examined the number 
of seats each party would have won under this scenario.  The simplest distributional uniformity was to 
assume that each party’s total vote was equally distributed between the constituencies it contested and 
Table 7.4 shows the number of seats the party would have won or lost under this ‘equally distributed’ 
scenario. 
<Table 7.4> 
 In the six elections after (and including) the 1996 Lok Sabha election, Table 7.4 shows that 
both parties would have lost seats under an equal distribution scenario.  In the 2014 Lok Sabha 
elections, the BJP, with its 31.3% share of the vote (which translated to 401,075 votes per 
constituency contested) won 282 seats.  If it had received exactly 401,075 votes in each of the 428 
constituencies it contested in 2014, it would have won 278 seats or in other words, the unequal 
distribution of its vote across the 428 seats it contested enabled it to win an additional four seats. 
Similarly, in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, the INC, with its 19.3% share of the vote (which 
translated to 230,465 votes per constituency contested) won 44 seats.  If it had received exactly 
230,465 votes in each of the 464 constituencies it contested in 2014, it would have won only 18 seats 
or, in other words, the unequal distribution of its vote across the 464 seats it contested enabled it to 
win an additional 26 seats. 
 The effect of distribution, on the number seats won, varied by election. As Table 7.4 shows, 
the effect of inequality in the inter-constituency distribution of the BJP vote, on the number of seats it 
won, was greatest in 1989, 1991, 1996, and 2009. In these elections, the distribution of its vote helped 
it win a large number of additional seats: 51 seats in 1984; 64 seats in 1991; 89 seats in 1996; and 76 
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seats in 2009.   By contrast, the effect of distribution on the number of seats won by the INC was 
more muted.  The most marked effect was in 1998 when its vote distribution across the constituencies 
helped it win an additional 91 seats; apart from this particular election, the INC vote distribution, 
compared to the BJP’ distribution, added far fewer seats to what it would have won with an equal 
distribution of votes across the constituencies. 
Simulation B: Equal Number of Votes Received 
 In the second simulation (Simulation B), it was assumed that the INC and the BJP received 
the same number of votes nationally – which was the average of their respective national vote – but 
that the distribution of the vote across the constituencies remained unchanged for both parties.  So, for 
example, for the 2014 Lok Sabha election it was assumed that both the INC and the BJP received 139, 
297,888 votes – which was an average of the INC’s 106,938,240, and the BJP’s 171,657,552 votes – 
and that, in each of the constituencies contested by them, their respective votes increased or 
decreased proportionately to the change in their national votes.  
In other words, in the Lok Sabha elections of 2014, the INC vote was marked up by 
multiplying the number of votes it received, in each of the 464 constituencies it contested, by1.3 and 
the BJP vote was marked down by multiplying the number of votes it received, in each of the 428 
constituencies it contested, by 0.81.4  The implication of this was that the distribution of the INC and 
the BJP vote remained unchanged: any inequality index like the Gini or the MLD would yield the 
same value on both the old and new set of INC - and on the old and new set of BJP - constituency 
votes   
<Table 7.5> 
Table 7.5 shows that in 2014, even with the INC and the BJP receiving the same number of 
votes – with the INC increasing its votes by 32.4 million votes with the BJP’s vote falling by an equal 
amount - the INC would have won 122 seats compared to the BJP’s 229.  As a result of these extra 
32.4 million votes, the INC would have gained won only 78 seats (44 to 122) while the loss of 32.4 
million votes would have deprived the BJP of only 53 seats.   
                                                     
4 1.3=139, 297,888/106,938,240 and 0.81=139, 297,888/171,657,552 
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Suppose that if distribution did not matter, the two parties, which shared the vote equally 
between them, would have also won an equal number of seats: for the 2014 Lok Sabha election, this 
would have been 163 seats each.5 So, in the 2014 Lok Sabha election, for reasons of vote distribution, 
the INC, which under this simulation was predicted to win 122 seats (see Table 7.5), under-performed 
by 41 seats, or by 25 percent of its equal division of 163 seats, and the BJP, which under this 
simulation was predicted to win 229 (see Table 7.5) seats over-performed by 66 seats, or by 40 
percent of its equal division of 163 seats. 
 In the 2009 Lok Sabha election, the equal division of votes was 98,773,088 which represented 
a shortfall for the INC (which received 119,110,824 votes in this election), and a bonus for the BJP 
(which received 78,435,352 votes in this election), of 20,337,736 votes.  Under this scenario, we might 
have expected both parties to each win 161 seats. However, it turned out that the INC would have 
won only 100 seats (61 fewer than expected 161 seats) and the BJP would have won 184 seats (23 
more than the expected 161 seats). So, in the Lok Sabha election of 2009, for reasons of vote 
distribution, the INC, which (under this simulation) was predicted to win 100 seats underperformed 
by 61 seats, or by 38 percent of its equal division of 161 seats, and the BJP, which (again under this 
simulation) was predicted to win 184 seats overperformed by 24 seats, or by 15 percent of its equal 
division of 161 seats. 
<Figure 7.4> 
 Figure 7.4 shows the under- and over-performance rates of the INC and the BJP for every Lok 
Sabha election since 1989.  The important point that emerges from this figure is that the INC has 
always underperformed as a party: it has always failed to translate an equal division of votes between 
it and the BJP into an equal division of seats.  By contrast, except for the 1989 and 2004 Lok Sabha 
elections, the BJP has always over-performed: it has succeeded in translating an equal division of 
votes between it and the INC into a (favourable) unequal division of seats. 
 
 
                                                     
5 The average of the 282 and 44seats won, respectively, by the BJP and INC. 
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7.6 Concluding Remarks 
 This chapter highlighted the importance of the distribution of a party’s votes in determining 
the number of seats it wins under a FPTP system. The ominous message that the results of this chapter 
contains for the INC is that even it received the same number of total votes as the BJP it would still, 
because of differences between them in their vote distributions, win fewer seats.  For the INC to 
nullify the effects of its distributional disadvantage it must raise its electoral popularity substantially 
above that of the BJP. 
 Or else, it must improve its vote distribution.  As the previous chapters have pointed out, the 
BJP enjoys a considerable advantage over the INC in the 204 constituencies in the Hindi speaking 
states while the INC does not enjoy, to the same degree, advantage over the BJP in the non-Hindi 
speaking states. This is an area that the INC needs to redress, either on its own or, more plausibly, 
with strategic alliances with like-minded parties.   
     
   
 
   
 
